Doctrines

Doctrine of Brittle Extremes:
A rule for exploratory discourse; it’s objective is to lower the level of certainty about unproven statements, without spending the energy logically refuting them. It holds that when a statement is absolute, the range of scenarios that could prove it untrue is considerably broadened, and therefore it probably lacks merit. Example: “Cats usually hate water” is a more meritorious statement than “all cats hate water”; a statement of “most cats don’t appreciate water very much” is more meritorious still.


Doctrine of Equally Suspect Center:
A reminder that just because two sides stand opposed on an issue, and are vocal about their disagreement, it does not necessarily follow that the extremes are both nonsensical or damaging while some compromise between them is superior or meritorious. Oftentimes, the compromise is just as ludicrous as the least-correct extreme; sometimes, even moreso. In any case, the “middle-of-the-road” viewpoint should be subject to the same scrutiny as any other position. A great example is: Should a county government fund a needle-exchange program to slow the spread of AIDS and other diseases spread through the ingestion of drugs with dirty needles — or — should such a suggestion be summarily rejected, under the auspices that governments shouldn’t supply resources for the purpose of expressly breaking a state law? One of these positions relies on a doctrine that governments should not contradict their own laws; the other relies on a premise that drug users will use drugs anyway, and since clean apparatus will slow the spread of AIDS, the public health interest overrides the doctrine of non-contradiction. These foundations are unrelated but also irreconcilable. An attempt to appeal to both sides, by legislating that (as an example) our county will fund an exchange of clean needles, but a strict quota will be established and the clean needles will never go above that quota — obviously would be counterproductive. It would fulfill the disadvantages of both extremes, while bringing to full fruition the benefits of neither one. The Doctrine, here, states that in any such conflict, the “middle-of-the-road” viewpoint ought to at least be subjected to scrutiny commensurate with what has been inflicted on each of the two extremes.


Doctrine of Yucky Stuff:
A rule for dispensing Justice, or more precisely, for determining who should be involved in dispensing it. The Doctrine recognizes that there are people who choose to remain “sensitized” to the wretched things evil men do to others by excusing themselves from observing it, or even being knowledgeable of it, and there are also people who deplore capital punishment. This is all fine and good, so long as it is also recognized that men do these evil things to each other whether the civilized observer elects to become informed of these reprehensible deeds, or not. Therefore, any official post involved in determining how punitive rules are to be applied, or if they are to be applied at all, should be filled by someone sturdy enough to comprehend these atrocities. No guilty man should be spared his due Justice, just because some arbitrating authority carries some personal sensibilities too brittle and fragile to withstand the responsible discharge of the authority vested there. Also, anyone who cares to form pacifist personal opinions about the harsher penalties, such as capital punishment, has an obligation to recuse himself from carrying any real authority with regard to such issues — the lives of our children depend on this. Bottom-line: You don’t want to think about yucky stuff, that’s fine; but deciding what happens in the aftermath of the yucky stuff is left to those who are rugged enough to deal with it.


Forbes Conundrum:
The name is a reference to my own experience with reading for the first time about Malcolm Forbes’ death in the National Enquirer in early 1990. The conundrum is, when we learn of an easily-verifiable and interesting event from a disreputable source, what are we to do with that information? And more to the point, how much does the source really matter if the process of verifying that the event really took place, is relatively costless? There are many who advance the argument that we should proceed as if the event didn’t happen (or advance other arguments that make sense only if one accepts this doctrine). This seems reasonable, in the case of the media mogul personally unknown to us shucking his mortal coil — the event has no direct bearing on any decision left to us. Therefore, it doesn’t qualify for the strictest definitions of “news.” If we bring such an event into the realm of “news” by introducing a cost to arriving at the wrong inference, this changes. For example, we may make a bet on whether Forbes is still alive. Only a fool would read of Forbes’ demise in The Enquirer, and bet hard-earned money that the mogul is still among us solely because of the questionable source. If it is an allowable term under the bet, that the bettor may double-check other sources to verify the event and then place his wage, then it would take a real lunatic to waive this privilege and proceed with the bet. Quot Erat Demonstrandum, to discard an assertion solely because of a perceived problem with the source making the assertion, is a reasonable doctrine only when the cost of being wrong is negligible. Barring some significant and unavoidable cost involved with the verification, such a doctrine is therefore incompatible with what we call “news.” It is a doctrine that offers dividends only in the efficiency with which information may be acquired, not in the verity of the information that has been so acquired.